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INTRODUCTION
There is surely no more appropriate context in which to discuss
interdisciplinary approaches to civil procedure than in a festschrift honoring
Stephen Burbank. In a diverse and expansive set of writings spanning several
decades, Burbank has drawn on a wide range of disciplines and methods in
approaching key questions of procedure. Masterful at delivering rigorous and
precise legal analysis, he has also acquired deep knowledge and
sophistication in a range of allied fields, including history and political
science. This has enabled him to utilize various qualitative and quantitative
methods in pursuit of the deeper social meaning and purposes of the law. As
he has insisted, “the technical reasoning required to be a master of doctrine
*
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is a necessary condition for . . . good scholarship about procedure,” but “it is
not a sufficient condition.”1 For those who “seek to understand law’s
significance,” it is vital to gain “perspectives in addition to the internal logic
of technical reasoning”2—and these can be supplied only by turning to
disciplines beyond the law, “including history, empiricism, and . . . political
science.”3
Among Burbank’s interdisciplinary pursuits, and dear to my own heart,
is the study of procedure from a historical perspective. But what precisely
does history contribute? Unlike the quantitative methods employed by
empiricists and widely embraced as the leading edge of both social science
and legal studies today, the historian’s toolkit is more amorphous and the
ensuing contribution harder to identify. As Burbank’s own work powerfully
suggests, what history affords, above all else, is much-needed context. As he
has often observed, procedure is power, providing the terms and structuring
the processes through which decisions of vast individual and social
consequence are made.4 But it is all too easy, “[p]articularly when the law in
question is labeled ‘procedure’ . . . to accept a doctrinal question at face value
(that is, to regard doctrine as an end in itself).”5 The unfortunate end result
of this tendency, he has cautioned, is “to view such a question apart from the
litigation dynamics that it engenders, and otherwise to ignore issues of power
that may be at stake in its resolution.”6 It is here that history can be of
particular use, revealing the social context that elucidates these vital power
dynamics, and thus making clear the stakes of our procedural choices.
As evidenced by Burbank’s scholarship, as well as that of others
participating in this symposium, historical approaches to procedure are of
interest to procedure scholars. But as is true across the legal academy and
broader university, enthusiasm for the historical method pales in comparison
to that for empirical social science. Among legal scholars, the most obvious
exception to that generalization is the relatively small but thriving field of
legal history, many of whose participants are not only trained as lawyers, but
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also hold doctorates in history. But if we look at the work produced by those
who identify as legal historians, remarkably little concerns questions of civil
procedure and practice. Although legal historical work abounds in such fields
as administrative law, labor and employment, and criminal law and
procedure, the same cannot be said of civil procedure.7 Shaped by the realist
turn in American approaches to law and legal education, as well as by their
training in history, U.S.-based legal historians—unlike their counterparts in
much of the rest of the globe—are largely externalist in orientation, eager to
focus on the lived experience of the law, rather than its formal trappings.
From this perspective, procedure and its technicalities seem far removed
from the social and political dynamics believed to matter. But if we take
seriously Burbank’s repeated insistence that procedure is power, we are left
with no small irony. Just as procedure scholars can be tempted to ignore
history in their rush to analyze doctrine in its own terms, ignoring the social
context that reveals the underlying reality of power, so too many historians—
in their pursuit of the social context that proceduralists sometimes ignore—
are inclined to ignore procedure. The nexus of procedure and history, where
power dynamics play out through the law, is thus all too often neglected, to
the ultimate detriment of scholarship in both fields.
As this suggests, we need more histories of procedure. In so arguing, I
mean to make not only a quantitative, but also a qualitative point. Our need,
in other words, is not only for more books and articles examining the history
of procedure, but also for more of the historian’s distinctive sensibility in the
work that is produced. What precisely is that sensibility? Emerging out of the
intersection of critical legal studies and cultural history, the legal historical
scholarship produced in the United States over the last several decades has
focused on context and contingency. By setting historical events in context,
the legal historian reveals the myriad contingencies undergirding past
developments, thus shedding light on the often complicated and
unpredictable nature of legal and social change—including, not least, the
role played by complex dynamics of power.8 Of late, a number of scholars
have grown frustrated with the reigning paradigm, arguing, in the words of
Christopher Tomlins, that the embrace of “totalized contingency” has
proven a dead end, giving rise to a growing sense of “indeterminacy” and
7

8

There are, of course, exceptions. See, e.g., KELLEN FUNK, THE LAWYERS’ CODE (forthcoming
2021); AMALIA D. KESSLER, INVENTING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGAL CULTURE, 1800–1877 (2017) (presenting historical accounts of
the development of American procedural law).
See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984) (describing the
various approaches to historical analysis within the field of critical legal studies).

2344

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:6

replacing “explanation” with “an aesthetic of ‘complexity.’”9 But despite the
rise of such critiques and the call for a new paradigm, one has yet to emerge.
Legal historians as a whole remain committed to pursuing context and
contingency.
There are, no doubt, many reasons for this persistence—including
perhaps, as Tomlins has put it, the fact that the field is “obdurately
atheoretical.”10 In addition, however, I suspect that many legal historians
doubt that attending to contexts and contingencies necessarily leads to
“totalized contingency.” Even while tracing particular contingent pathways
of development, the legal historian can identify deeper, structural and
institutional forces that also shaped past events and that were less subject to
possible change. Deployed in this way, the historical focus on context and
contingency can have great explanatory force. It is true, to some extent, that
a focus on a different set of contexts might shine light on a different set of
causes, thus leading us back to the problem of indeterminacy. But the valueadded of history is not that it is a social science that purports to present us
with definitive, falsifiable accounts of legal and social development. It is
instead an interpretive discipline that opens up new and important lines of
inquiry that we might not otherwise even have known to consider.
To call for more of the historian’s sensibility in the writing of legal
histories of procedure and practice is thus, ultimately, to call for more and
broader contextualization. But what exactly does this mean? As I see it, there
are three deeply interrelated components to the pursuit of historical
contextualization: identifying a broad range of relevant contexts, reading
widely in the primary sources (beyond the immediate legislative history of a
particular rule or statute of interest), and perhaps most importantly, retaining
an imaginative openness to the strangeness of the past. These are not
sequential moves that provide a formulaic method or recipe to be
systematically applied, but are instead better understood as the constitutive
components of an overarching frame of mind. Thus, insight that a particular
context ought to be explored might lead the legal historian to examine a
broader range of sources than initially contemplated. But so too, reading
widely in the sources might bring to light a relevant context that had not
previously been considered. And throughout this iterative process of
identifying contexts and reading sources, the legal historian must retain a
9
10
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degree of imaginative openness, since without that, potentially relevant
contexts and sources might not even be recognized as such.
But this is all far too abstract. To try to make more concrete the ways in
which the historian’s sensibility might contribute to legal historical
scholarship on procedure, I will focus the remainder of my remarks on an
example drawn from my current work on the history of modern American
arbitration law and practice.
I. CONTEXTUALIZING THE RISE OF MODERN AMERICAN ARBITRATION
Given the highly contested and ever-expanding practice of binding,
mandatory arbitration, arbitration law is one of those subjects in the broader
field of civil procedure and practice to which some historical work has in fact
been devoted. The work produced to date has taken two main forms. One
line of inquiry explores the legislative history of the Federal Arbitration Act
of 1925 (FAA). Highlighting the role of commercial interests in lobbying for
the statute, this research suggests that these interests envisioned arbitration
as a device for resolving commercial disputes between parties of roughly
equal bargaining power and never contemplated that it would be deployed,
as today, through contracts of adhesion drafted by large corporations and
imposed on millions of consumers and employees.11 A second line of inquiry
examines the U.S. Supreme Court’s caselaw interpreting the FAA over the
decades since the statute was first enacted, emphasizing, in particular, the
extent to which the court has refashioned core underpinnings of the legal
framework first put into place (including through its own decisions), even
while continuing to insist on purported interpretive continuity.12
11
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See generally IMRE STEPHEN SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN
ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA (2013). This reading of history has also been cited as a
justification for legislation that would prevent the enforcement of pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate consumer and employment disputes. See also Arbitration Fairness Act, H.R. 1873, 112th
Cong. § 402(a) (2011) (The FAA “was intended to apply to disputes between commercial entities
of generally similar sophistication and bargaining power.”); Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.
Ct. 1612, 1642–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The legislative hearings and debate leading up to
the FAA’s passage evidence Congress’ aim to enable merchants of roughly equal bargaining power
to enter into binding agreements to arbitrate commercial disputes . . . . The FAA’s legislative history
also shows that Congress did not intend the statute to apply to arbitration provisions in
employment contracts.”).
See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Stephanie Garlock & Annie J. Wang, Collective Preclusion and Inaccessible
Arbitration: Data, Non-Disclosure, and Public Knowledge, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 611, 619–26 (2020);
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Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE. L. J. 2804, 2855–73 (2015); see generally THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU,
TOWARD A NEW FEDERAL LAW OF ARBITRATION (2014); J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and
the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L. J. 3052 (2015).
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While this work has been valuable, it only begins to scratch the surface of
what a deeply contextualized, historical approach might bring to bear. How
then might we expand our vision? One initial possibility is to offer a more
deeply contextualized account of the FAA itself, extending beyond its
immediate legislative history and subsequent interpretation. Although
relatively rare, some of the most promising work in the field has been in this
direction. Consider, for example, Katherine Van Wezel Stone’s argument
that the enactment of various state arbitration statutes and the FAA in the
1920s should be understood in relation to the associationalist vision of the
state advanced by Herbert Hoover in his capacity as Secretary of Commerce,
as typified by his effort to promote trade associations. As she notes, Hoover
urged the development of what historian Ellis Hawley has described as an
“associative state”—one in which government would facilitate the
development of trade associations, professional organizations and other
group forms and encourage these to share research and expertise, develop
common standards, and otherwise work together to promote a more efficient
and humane mode of capitalism.13 By situating the emergence of the FAA
(whose enactment Hoover supported) against the backdrop of this
associationalist project of governance, Van Wezel Stone suggests that the
statute was designed to facilitate the ability of groups—envisioned as
“normative communities” sharing core values and interests—to resolve their
own internal disputes and thereby engage in self-governance. The FAA was
thus never intended to apply, as it does now, to relations between those who
do not inhabit the same normative community—as is the case, for example,
of large corporations and their consumers.14
Hiro Aragaki and Imre Szalai have also done important work
contextualizing the FAA—in their case by identifying the parallels between
arguments for the reform of statutory arbitration and the broader
Progressive-era campaign for procedural reform. As they note, the campaign
for procedural reform emerged from lawyers’ widespread perception that a
crisis had arisen in access to justice, as courts, inherited from an earlier era,
proved unable to handle the vast influx of cases generated by rapid
industrialization and urbanization.15 From this perspective, Aragaki explains,
the FAA was not intended, as assumed today, to advance contractual values
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See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion under the Federal Arbitration Act,
77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 987–991 (1999).
See id. at 992–94.
See Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1939, 1964–
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of “autonomy, consent, and self-determination,” such that arbitral
agreements must be strictly enforced.16 Instead, he argues, the statute aimed
to facilitate access to justice by promoting such core procedural values as
“simplicity, flexibility, and intolerance of technicalities.”17
These efforts to contextualize the FAA are significant contributions to our
understanding of the social meaning and purposes of the statute—ones that
serve to complicate and unsettle now dominant views. But if we step back
even further and examine them together, rather than in isolation, another
possibility emerges for contextualizing the rise of modern arbitration law and
practice—namely, decentering the FAA itself. Our focus today is on the FAA
because, especially after the U.S. Supreme Court held that it preempted state
law,18 the statute has become central to shaping our current arbitration
landscape. But ironically, to take the FAA as both the starting and focal point
of the history of modern arbitration law and practice serves to naturalize the
expansive vision of the statute that the court itself has imposed through its
relatively recent jurisprudence. If we pull back the lens sufficiently far, the
FAA suddenly appears as one among many contemporary efforts, not only
to promote arbitration, but also to remake the state and its institutions in the
early twentieth century—all with an eye toward addressing the myriad new
challenges of modern, urban, industrial life. And key among these was, of
course, the burgeoning administrative state. Might the growing power of the
administrative state, a familiar set piece of U.S. legal history, be a relevant
context for examining the rise of modern arbitration law and practice,
including—but also extending well beyond—the FAA itself?
As it turns out, in the early decades of the twentieth century, a wide range
of contemporary commentators regularly drew parallels between the spread
of arbitration and the growth of administrative agencies. Consider, as just
one example, the highly influential Roscoe Pound, longtime dean of the
Harvard Law School and an early, leading advocate of procedural and
judicial reform. A longstanding proponent of arbitration, Pound joined the
advisory council of the newly established American Arbitration Association
(AAA) in 1926. In letters that he exchanged that fall with then president of
the AAA Lucius Eastman, Pound observed that there were many advocates
of arbitration who viewed it as a solution to the ills of modern industrial
society, hoping to see it “replace the law of the land” or “become our
16
17
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Aragaki, supra note 15, at 1941.
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law invalidating certain FAA-protected arbitration agreements).
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everyday resource for social control.”19 On this view, arbitration was
emerging alongside administrative agencies as part of a broader series of
efforts to substitute for the many inadequacies of the formal court system. As
Pound commented, the present moment was characterized by a proliferation
of “minute legislation, multiplication of administrative powers and standards,
and an increased resort to arbitration.”20 Among their commonalities, in his
view, was that such responses sought to infuse substantial discretion into
decision-making processes, and were thus all “in the direction of an
individualized treatment of particular cases[,] dealing with each case as if it
were unique and of no relation to any other.”21
As Pound and other observers noted, both arbitration tribunals and
administrative agencies were institutions that, while deeply rooted in history,
were then experiencing a remarkable resurgence as responses to the
challenges of modern industrial society. More particularly, both arbitration
and administrative adjudication provided much-needed alternatives to the
formal court system and its adversarial procedures. Traditional court
procedure was criticized as exceedingly slow and inaccessible, placing the
entire weight of factual investigation on the parties and their lawyers and thus
exacerbating the injustices that stemmed from rampant socio-economic
inequality. What was needed, many believed, was more streamlined
procedures that would enable decision-makers to attend more to substantive
justice and less to procedural technicalities. Such procedures would endow
decision-makers with significant discretion, including to pursue factual
investigation. And these decision-makers, in turn, would have relevant nonlegal expertise, enabling them to exercise their discretion in ways that
ensured more accurate and efficient dispute resolution. Both arbitration and
administrative adjudication were widely thought to be forms of procedure
that shared these key characteristics. Indeed, the parallels between the two
were such that agency adjudication—and, in particular, what the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 would later classify as “informal
adjudication”—might itself be described as a form of arbitration.22
19
20
21
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Letter from Roscoe Pound to Lucius R. Eastman (November 11, 1926), in CIVIL WAR: AMERICAN
LEGAL MANUSCRIPTS FROM THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL LIBRARY (Proquest database).
Id.
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The various ways in which contemporaries drew parallels between arbitration and agency
adjudication are detailed below. See text accompanying infra notes 26–30, 38–41, 45–50, 59–64. See
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(1929) (describing the turn to both administrative adjudication and arbitration and conciliation as
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JUSTICE 1–16, 610, 618 (1939) (same).
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From this perspective, arbitration was not, as is now commonly supposed,
a mode of private ordering, enabling parties to resolve their dispute in private
and in accordance with their own contractualized preferences. Rather than
an effort to retreat from the state, arbitration was instead viewed by many as
a tool for remaking and thereby strengthening state institutions. But while
there was widespread agreement that arbitration was intimately connected to
a broader project of state-building, views as to how exactly such arbitration
was to be conducted—by whom and toward what ends—varied widely. It is
only by looking well beyond the FAA, reading across multiple sources,
produced in multiple institutional contexts, that we can begin to capture the
extent of the contemporary enthusiasm for arbitration as a mode of public
governance. A complete account of these contexts and sources lies well
beyond the scope of these pages. But a brief overview should suffice to
demonstrate the nature and depth of the contemporary commitment to
deploying arbitration in service of a broader program of improved
governance.
II. CORPORATIST MODELS
An important set of arguments for arbitration as a mode of public
governance, akin to (and intertwined with) administrative agency
adjudication, stemmed from the early twentieth-century enthusiasm for
corporatism, or state-coordinated, group self-governance. Across the
political spectrum, a broad range of business leaders, economists, and
policymakers argued that the new challenges posed by modern industrial
society required a rejection of classical liberalism’s individualist model of
social and political organization and an embrace instead of a more groupbased or corporatist model. Corporatist thought and experimentation never
took as deep root or departed as much from core liberal principles as was the
case in contemporary Europe, where fascist regimes came into power and
more left-leaning models (like guild socialism in Britain) also made some
inroads.23 But corporatist discourse was, nonetheless, commonplace in the
contemporary United States and had some meaningful purchase in practice.
Such arguments were advanced by right-leaning business interests eager to
thwart burgeoning regulatory efforts, as well as by more left-leaning thinkers
23

See, e.g., HOWARD J. WIARDA, CORPORATISM AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS: THE OTHER
GREAT “ISM” 18–19, 34–43, 134–39 (1996); CHARLES S. MAIER, RECASTING BOURGEOIS
EUROPE: STABILIZATION IN FRANCE, GERMANY, AND ITALY IN THE DECADE AFTER WORLD
WAR I 3–15, 353–54, 579–94 (1975); James Q. Whitman, Of Corporatism, Fascism, and the First New
Deal, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 747, 749–51 (1991).
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and policymakers searching for ways to attend more fully to the needs of
labor (even while eschewing radical redistribution). And central to all these
corporatist projects was arbitration—envisioned as a tool that was vital for
helping to establish and maintain forms of state-coordinated, group selfgovernance.
The corporatist conception of arbitration advanced by business interests
was articulated most forcefully by Clarence F. Birdseye in a book entitled
Arbitration and Business Ethics: A Study of the History and Philosophy of Various Types
of Arbitration and Their Relations to Business Ethics. Published in 1926, the book
was widely reviewed and came to be regularly cited in contemporary
publications, becoming a standard point of reference in discussions of
(especially commercial) arbitration.24 As a “corporation lawyer with a large
practice,” Birdseye was particularly interested in the use of arbitration to
resolve business-related disputes.25 That said, as suggested by its subtitle, his
book ranged widely, considering “Various Types of Arbitration.” Two of the
book’s key premises were that arbitration and administrative agency
adjudication were functionally akin and that both were experiencing a
renaissance as tools thought to facilitate the remaking of the state along
corporatist lines.
According to Birdseye, administrative agency adjudication was a subset
of the broader category of arbitration. As he put it, such adjudication was
“Official Administrative Arbitration by Nonjudicial Functionaries.”26 Like
arbitration, administrative agency adjudication was a means of resolving
disputes by relying on non-legally trained individuals with relevant expertise
in the matter at hand, rather than on generalist lawyer-judges. In his words,
“well-qualified citizens, who are not members of the judiciary, but who are
presumed to be well acquainted with local customs and rules—experts
therein—are designated by the statutes to act in a judicial capacity, and often

24

25
26

See, e.g., Martin Gang, 15 CAL. L. REV. 76, 76–77 (1926) (reviewing CLARENCE F. BIRSDSEYE,
ARBITRATION AND BUSINESS ETHICS (1926)); J. Kent Greene, 13 A.B.A. J. 35 (1927) (reviewing
CLARENCE F. BIRSDSEYE, ARBITRATION AND BUSINESS ETHICS (1926)); Paul L. Sayre, 2 IND. L.
J. 352, 352–55 (1927) (reviewing CLARENCE F. BIRSDSEYE, ARBITRATION AND BUSINESS ETHICS
(1926)); JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, SUPPLEMENT TO SECOND EDITION OF THE TREATISE ON THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE 18 n.1 (1934) (citing CLARENCE F. BIRSDSEYE,
ARBITRATION AND BUSINESS ETHICS (1926)).
Otis Notman, More Lawyers Who Write Books: Mr. Birdseye of ‘Revised Statutes’ Fame, N.Y. TIMES, April
6, 1907, at BR224.
CLARENCE F. BIRDSEYE, ARBITRATION AND BUSINESS ETHICS: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY AND
PHILOSOPHY OF VARIOUS TYPES OF ARBITRATION AND THEIR RELATIONS TO BUSINESS
ETHICS 151 (1926).
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as judge, jury and sheriff.”27 While noting that administrative agency
adjudication dated back many centuries, Birdseye suggested that the
conditions of mass industrial society were serving greatly to expand the need
for such “arbitration by official nonjudicial arbitrators.”28 As he explained,
there was a new “tendency” that could be “seen in this country”—namely,
the conferral of “quasi judicial powers . . . on our insurance, banking and
other departments.”29 But properly understood, the development of new
bureaus and commissions with adjudicatory authority was “only an extension
to bureaucracy of the fundamental principle of commercial arbitration—that
a permanent tribunal of fair minded experts is the natural and necessary
forum to decide technical questions with which they are thoroughly
familiar.”30
As this suggests, Birdseye believed that the model of “commercial
arbitration . . . [as] a permanent tribunal of fair minded experts” was
applicable well beyond commercial disputes as such. It was best understood
as an ideal type, designating a mode of arbitration practice that might be
applied in any and all intra-group disputes. Surveying the contemporary
landscape, Birdseye insisted that the era was defined by a pervasive tendency
to organize into groups—one that was “not peculiar to business, but is a part
of a great national movement to organize and suborganize, which
characterizes the age and is plainly discernible in the religious and club life of
the country.”31 In his telling, such groups arose as an attempt to temper the
excesses of liberal individualist competition, which had worked to the
detriment of all. More particularly, groups required their members to abide
by common standards, thus reasserting group norms as against forms of
individual self-interest that might threaten intra-communal and social peace.
And crucially, these standards were enforced internally—within the group
itself—through arbitration. On this view, the corporatist restructuring of
society, which ensured that “the better conditions of the new collectivism”
would replace “the evils of the older individualism,” hinged on practices of
arbitration.32
With an eye toward quelling pervasive labor unrest, Birdseye argued that
the medieval guild epitomized the ideal type of commercial arbitration. The

27
28
29
30
31
32

Id. at 152.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 153.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 5.
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guild-based model presumed that the interests of capital and labor were
fundamentally the same and called on industrialists, as leaders of the
community of industry, to guide workers through arbitration to recognize
that their own interests were in fact those of their employers. More
particularly, industrialists would encourage workers to view themselves as
(subsidiary) participants in a common industrial community, thereby
ensuring not only labor’s well-being, but also its quietude: “Some degree of
self-government sobers and satisfies the employees and makes them more
conservative in their views and demands, and more reasonableness is
engendered on both sides.”33 As for where this left the state, Birdseye made
clear that the state’s administrative apparatus would continue to expand so
as to provide much-needed guidance in addressing the challenges of
industrial modernity. But this apparatus would be firmly in the hands of
business interests—a logical entailment, he implied, of the fact that
administrative agency adjudication was itself just a form of “commercial
arbitration.”
Business interests, moreover, were not the only ones who pointed to the
parallels between arbitration and administrative agency adjudication and
who did so in service of a corporatist project of state building. More leftleaning institutional economists—including especially University of
Wisconsin professor John Commons and his students—also propounded a
corporatist model of arbitration, but with different goals in mind. On their
view, such a model would simultaneously promote the interests of labor and
ensure the continued survival of capitalism. In no way radical, these men
argued that an arbitration-backed model of “constitutional government in
industry” would offer a third way between relatively unmediated capitalism
(of the sort appealing to Birdseye and his ilk) and more radical socialist
alternatives.34
Commons and his acolytes shared Birdseye’s view that the early
twentieth-century was characterized by the rapid emergence of new forms of
group-based organization—particularly in the sphere of capital-labor
relations. So too, and again like Birdseye, they insisted that such group-based
organizations were arising in response to the challenges of modern industrial
capitalism and that they were characterized by the embrace of arbitration as
a tool of self-governance—one that would help to address the growing
number of industrial conflicts pitting capital against labor. But while Birdseye

33
34

Id. at 129.
See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
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framed these developments as a return backward in time to the model of the
medieval guild, Commons conceived of the directionality of history in very
different terms. In Commons’s telling, the contemporary enthusiasm for
arbitration-backed, group self-governance was forward-looking in nature—
the end point of enlightened social and political modernity. More
particularly, he described these trends—including especially the
development of arbitration-backed collective bargaining agreements—as an
offshoot of the modern emergence of ideals of democratic, constitutional
government or, as he put it, the rise of “constitutional government in
industry.”35
Within this emerging model of industrial self-governance, arbitrators
served the vital role of the judiciary. As detailed by Commons’s student,
William Leiserson, himself a prominent economist, collective bargaining
agreements functioned as the constitutions of industrial communities and
“the vast majority of [these] . . . now provide for arbitrators to be called in”
to resolve disputes arising over the agreements’ interpretation.36 Serving as a
neutral outsider or “third party,” the arbitrator—like a judge in the political
state—was able to provide a trusted, objective resolution to the dispute.37 But
though a neutral outsider, the arbitrator was chosen by group insiders and
bound to adhere to the group’s constitution and laws, thus ensuring that such
arbitration constituted a form of internal self-governance.
In line with the contemporary tendency to equate arbitration and
administrative agency adjudication, Leiserson—again like Birdseye—drew
important parallels between his ideal of arbitration and the burgeoning
administrative state. More particularly, Leiserson specified that effective
industrial arbitration was a form of judicial machinery that was more akin to
administrative agency adjudication than to traditional court-based, judicial
processes. Industrial arbitrators, he asserted, “saw the[ir] duties . . . as much
the same as those of a Workmen’s Compensation Board or a Public Utilities
Commission.”38 Pointing to John E. Williams, who had served as an
arbitrator in the much-discussed New York cloak and suit industry strike that
erupted in 1914, Leiserson argued that Williams conceived of his role as
“quasi-judicial, partaking both of a court and an administrative officer.”39

35
36
37
38
39

JOHN R. COMMONS, TRADE UNIONISM AND LABOR PROBLEMS 1 (1905).
William M. Leiserson, Constitutional Government in American Industries, 12 AM. ECON. REV. 56, 64
(1922, Supplement).
Id. at 63.
Id. at 65 n.8.
Id.
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Like someone conducting administrative agency adjudication, Williams
understood himself to be endowed with the discretion to disregard
procedural and evidentiary technicalities and to pursue substantive justice
instead. In Leiserson’s words, he sought “to get the real truth in industrial
cases, which as in ordinary law cases are [sic] often hidden by the trial.”40
In thus emphasizing the similarities between industrial arbitration and
administrative agency adjudication, Leiserson drew in part on his own
experience working in the Wisconsin Industrial Commission that Commons
had helped to establish in 1911. As Commons and his students understood
the role of the commission (and more generally, that of the rapidly expanding
administrative state), it was to assist in the efforts of business and labor to
engage in industrial self-governance, providing vital guidance and
coordination, including not least through fact-finding, investigatory
support.41 From this perspective, industrial arbitration conducted by private
business and labor entities, on the one hand, and administrative agency
adjudication pursued by government officials, on the other, operated in
much the same fashion and with many of the same goals—through expert
oversight aimed at facilitating industrial self-governance.42 Accordingly,
much like Birdseye—though with different goals in mind—Commons and
his students advanced a broader agenda of arbitration-backed group selfgovernance pursuant to which private ordering would ultimately serve to
remake social organization and public authority.
It bears emphasis, moreover, that the embrace of arbitration as the
foundation of a new corporatist form of governance was not confined to the
writings of theorists. Herbert Hoover’s project of advancing an “associative

40
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Id.
See DONALD W. ROGERS, MAKING CAPITALISM SAFE: WORK SAFETY AND HEALTH
REGULATION IN AMERICA, 1880–1940, at 48–49 (2009); WILLIAM J. BREEN, LABOR MARKET
POLITICS AND THE GREAT WAR: THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, THE STATES, AND THE FIRST
U.S. EMPLOYMENT SERVICE, 1907–1933, at 122 (1997).
It bears emphasis that even while focusing on labor relations, Commons and Leiserson viewed
arbitration as a kind of umbrella procedure, such that much could also be learned from
developments pertaining to the arbitration of commercial disputes. As they saw it, business’s
embrace of commercial arbitration provided a model for labor arbitration. In an article coauthored with fellow economist Edward W. Morehouse in 1927, Commons bemoaned the fact that
courts were thus far unwilling to enforce “arbitration awards under ‘contracts’ between unions and
employers’ associations.” John R. Commons and E. W. Morehouse, Legal and Economic Job Analysis,
37 YALE L. J. 139, 178 n.67 (1927). Such awards, the authors suggested, ought to be treated with
the same judicial solicitousness as that being increasingly shown to those rendered in commercial
disputes: “Should not the courts allow to extra-judicial adjustment of labor relations at least the
same freedom from legal consequences that is increasingly allowed in the arbitration of commercial
relations?” Id. at 178.
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state,” astutely identified by Van Wezel Stone as an important context for
the enactment of the FAA, was itself a significant outgrowth of this
corporatist discourse. So too, the brief-lived establishment of the National
Industrial Recovery Administration during the First New Deal borrowed in
key respects from this broader, corporatist vision, and in so doing, gave pride
of place to arbitration.43
Enacted in 1933, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) sought to
establish a new cooperative regime in which business and labor worked with
one another to develop a stable, less competitive environment. More
particularly, the statute directed business and labor interests to create codes
of fair competition, thus delegating major self-regulatory power to private
industry. Negotiated within and tailored to particular industries, the codes
set minimum wages and maximum hours and encouraged various forms of
price stabilization. Each code, moreover, was directly administered by a code
authority that was supposed to consist of representatives of business, labor,
and the public.44 At the same time, the system as a whole was overseen by a
newly established federal administrative agency: the National Recovery
Administration (NRA).45 Informed by a corporatist logic of industrial selfgovernance, the NIRA experiment assumed that business and labor would
voluntarily cooperate in designing and complying with the new codes. Such
cooperation was, however, to be fostered and sustained through practices of
arbitration, as well as by modes of administrative agency adjudication (or
“adjustment”) that were all but indistinguishable from arbitration.
The NRA and code authorities were charged with pursuing the
“adjustment” of disputes over whether a code violation had occurred. More
particularly, the NRA Manual for the Adjustment of Complaints specified that,
when conflicts over alleged code violations arose, the first step toward
resolution was to assist with fact-finding.46 Since many conflicts were
assumed to arise from misunderstandings, such findings of fact—ideally
43
44

45
46

See generally DONALD R. BRAND, CORPORATISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: A STUDY OF THE
NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION (1988); Whitman, supra note 23.
See BRAND, supra note 43, at 99–116. In practice, as the codes were actually drafted, the code
authorities came to be dominated almost entirely by business interests, thus giving little, if any voice
to labor. See CHARLES L. DEARING ET AL., THE ABC OF THE NRA 94 (1934) (“The code authority
is usually composed of members of the industry . . . .”); Theda Skocpol, Political Response to Capitalist
Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal, 10 POL. & SOC’Y 155, 178–79 (1980)
(explaining that labor lacked meaningful representation on code authorities).
See BRAND, supra note 43, at 81–95.
See NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION, MANUAL FOR THE ADJUSTMENT OF
COMPLAINTS BY STATE DIRECTORS AND CODE AUTHORITIES 28–29 (1934) (describing the
procedure of handling complaints by an “Industrial Adjustment Agency”).
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issued through the auspices of the code authority and thus harnessing “the
pressure of opinion within the Industry”—were thought often to be sufficient
to secure adjustment.47 But when more was needed, the manual
recommended “adjustment . . . by conciliation, mediation, and arbitration,”
without distinguishing in any way between these procedures.48 Thereafter, it
indicated simply that “at any stage in the adjustment of any complaint,” the
code authority or NRA officials “may seek to induce the parties to
arbitrate.”49
The nascent American Arbitration Association (AAA) took heed of this
guidance. Established in 1926, the AAA was still struggling to survive well
into the 1930s. Recognizing in the NIRA regime a potentially valuable
opportunity to reimagine its functions and fortunes, the association
successfully negotiated with NRA officials for the insertion of arbitration
provisions into the codes—including, not surprisingly, provisions that
required the use of AAA rules and/or staff. The end result was to promulgate
AAA-based arbitration in ways that proved to be a significant boon to the
association at a time when its existence remained precarious, thus
contributing to its ultimately successful efforts to position itself as the
country’s preeminent general purpose arbitration provider.50 In all these
respects, the NIRA regime was the apotheosis of contemporary corporatist
aspirations: Seeking seamlessly to blend the administrative state and
industrial self-governance, it called on an inchoate mix of informal agency
adjudication and arbitration.
II. THE MATERNALIST MODEL
Alongside these various corporatist models for deploying arbitration as a
tool of public governance, there emerged another model that, while also
premised on the parallels between arbitration and administrative agency
adjudication, pursued different ends. This was what we might call a
“maternalist” model of arbitration.
47
48
49

50

Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 29. In practice, the details of adjustment and arbitration were sometimes further specified in
individual codes, and there was substantial variability among these. See FRANCES KELLOR,
ARBITRATION IN THE NEW INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 181–94 (1934) (describing variations among
code authorities).
See Report from Lucius R. Eastman, President, Am. Arb. Ass’n 2 (1933) (on file with author); Report
of the Arbitration Committee 1 (detailing the AAA’s successful efforts to include arbitration
provisions within the codes and the opportunities thereby afforded the association further to
develop and expand).
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During the Progressive Era, white upper- and middle-class women
reformers advanced what scholars have described as a project of maternalist
state-building, aimed at assisting poor (often immigrant) working women and
their children. These reformers managed to secure the enactment of a great
deal of protective legislation. But in addition, relying on the remarkable
porousness of the American state, they succeeded in funding and establishing
a number of administrative agencies—including, most famously, the federal
Children’s Bureau.51 Within this broader project of maternalist statebuilding, there emerged a maternalist model of agency-based arbitration.
In pursuing this policy-making agenda, as well as their own
empowerment, women reformers justified their demands and their own
claimed expertise by virtue of their identity as women and thus as (actual or
potential) mothers. More particularly, reformers drew on the then dominant
ideology of separate spheres, which depicted women as innately suited to
the private, domestic sphere of home and family, to argue that women
possessed a distinctively moral and nurturing, maternal nature. On this
view, women were endowed with a unique capacity and responsibility to
pursue legal and social reforms in the interests of the many poor women and
children struggling under the conditions of modern, urban industrial life.52
This maternalist program of state-building was rooted in the urban
settlement houses that were established by elite white women in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to assist the many thousands of new
immigrants then flooding into the country. Reformers utilized the settlement
house as a home base from which to pursue a program of socially oriented
research and reform, and in so doing, laid claim to a domain of feminine
expertise in household management that justified their efforts to teach
immigrant women how to manage their own homes and families.53 But as
they researched the social structures sustaining urban poverty and crime,
reformers came to believe that attending properly to the needs of immigrant
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See, e.g., THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 312–524 (1992) (explaining the origins of child welfare
policy); ROBYN MUNCY, CREATING A FEMALE DOMINION IN AMERICAN REFORM 1890–1935, at
38-65 (1991) (describing the creation of the Children’s Bureau). Although there is widespread
agreement that a significant subset of the policy-making efforts pursued by elite white women in
this period can and should be described as “maternalist,” there has been much debate about the
precise parameters of this term. For an overview of this literature, including persistent debates, see
Felicia A. Kornbluh, The New Literature on Gender and the Welfare State: The U.S. Case, 22 FEMINIST
STUD. 171 (1996); Molly Ladd Taylor, Toward Defining Maternalism in U.S. History, 5 J. WOMEN’S
HIST. 110 (1993).
See SKOCPOL, supra note 51, at 321–72; MUNCY, supra note 51, at 36–37, 48.
See SKOCPOL, supra note 51, at 343–50; MUNCY, supra note 51, at 3–37.
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women and their children would require them to address causal factors
extending well beyond the sphere of the home, narrowly defined. They thus
turned their attention to the broader municipality (and, in short order, to
the state and nation as a whole), framing this more expansive reach as a
form of “municipal housekeeping.”54
One such reformer was Frances Kellor, a stalwart of the settlement house
movement, who would later go on to become a founding member and the
longtime acting head of the AAA.55 Having long devoted herself to exposing
and preventing the exploitation of the poor (often immigrant) women serving
as domestic workers, Kellor established the New York State Bureau of
Industries and Immigration (BII) in 1910.56 The BII’s mission was to identify
and root out the myriad injustices suffered by immigrants as a whole—a
mission that, in line with the general thrust of maternalist state-building, she
identified as a key “problem of municipal house-keeping.”57 As part of this
same maternalist vision, Kellor designed the agency such that it was able to
call on a broad network of women’s groups to provide much-needed
lobbying and investigative support.58 So too, in assisting individual
immigrant complainants, the BII adopted a model of dispute resolution that
followed from its broader, maternalist orientation. This model focused on
promoting informal arbitration or conciliation—two procedures that were
long viewed by many as all but interchangeable, especially before laterenacted statutory reforms made arbitration agreements more readily
enforceable.59

54
55
56

57
58

59

SKOCPOL, supra note 51, at 333, 337, 529.
See Amalia D. Kessler, Arbitration and Americanization: The Paternalism of Progressive Procedural Reform, 124
YALE L. J. 2940, 2973–83 (2015) (describing Kellor’s contributions).
See JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860–1925,
at 239–41 (2d ed. 1988) (describing Kellor’s work in New York as a public servant); William Joseph
Maxwell, Frances Kellor in the Progressive Era: A Case Study in the Professionalization of Reform
181–201 (Apr. 22, 1968) (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with author) (describing
Kellor’s work in New York and New Jersey); John Press, France Kellor, Americanization, and the
Quest for Participatory Democracy 69–90 (2009) (Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (on file
with author) (describing Kellor’s contributions to “Americanization”).
The Immigrant Woman, AM. HEBREW & JEWISH MESSENGER, June 16, 1916, at 184 (quoting
Kellor).
In December 1909, Kellor created a local New York Committee of the North American Civic
League for Immigrants (NACL), which was extended to New Jersey in 1911. Kellor worked to
intertwine this committee with the BII, using the private organization to provide extensive staffing
and funding to the state agency. See HIGHAM, supra note 56, at 240; Press, supra note 56, at 70–80.
The New York-New Jersey Committee, in turn, developed extensive networks of support through
its connections with women’s groups, which were thus made available to the BII. See Amalia D.
Kessler, A Maternalist Model of Arbitration (unpublished book chapter) (on file with author).
See Kessler, Arbitration and Americanization, supra note 55, at 2956–61.
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Kellor and her supporters viewed the BII as implementing a distinctively
maternalist approach to these procedures—one initially cultivated in the
women’s protective associations that, as detailed by Felice Batlan, emerged
in the late nineteenth century as the earliest legal aid societies.60 From the
perspective of Kellor and her allies, this maternalist model was defined in
antithesis to the informal arbitration or conciliation that was becoming
increasingly popular within newer, male-dominated legal aid societies and
local municipal courts. As argued by the author and social reformer Kate
Halladay Claghorn, these male-dominated entities pursued a highly legalistic
mode of dispute resolution, focused only on claims cognizable in law. But this
legalistic approach negated the very possibility of achieving a lasting and
meaningful settlement, since such a settlement was possible only where those
overseeing the proceedings had gained a complete, fully contextualized
understanding of the parties and their dispute. As Claghorn observed:
The legal-aid society follows the modern court in laying emphasis on
conciliation and arbitration. But how can these be effected if the personal
peculiarities of clients and their opponents are not taken into account?
Conciliation and arbitration depend upon persuasion, upon the voluntary
co-operation of the parties in interest, not upon the sanctions of the law. The
parties must be approached on the basis of their own feelings and prejudices
about the matter in hand. How can this be done if the differences are not
thought important and are not seen?61
On this view, it was women reformers like Kellor, who excelled qua
women in the arts of listening and care—as demonstrated by, among other
things, their contemporary development of the burgeoning new field of social
work. As such, it was they who were best able to design effective modes of
arbitration and conciliation.
The BII’s maternalist approach to informal arbitration or conciliation
therefore began with an effort to gather the claimant’s entire story. Having
done so, the agency would then order “a hearing . . . in the hope of bringing
the parties together, clearing their minds and getting them to adjust the
matter.”62 In true maternalist fashion, the ultimate goal of such adjustment
was not only to resolve the dispute, but also to attend to the immigrant’s full
range of social and material needs. Toward this end, the BII connected
60
61
62

See generally FELICE BATLAN, WOMEN AND JUSTICE FOR THE POOR: A HISTORY OF LEGAL AID,
1863–1945 (2015); Kessler, A Maternalist Model, supra note 58.
KATE HOLLADAY CLAGHORN, THE IMMIGRANT’S DAY IN COURT 473 (1923).
N.Y. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF INDUSTRIES AND
IMMIGRATION FOR THE TWELVE MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1911, at 124 (1912).
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immigrants with various individuals and entities able to provide such
assistance. As reported by the New York Tribune in May 1912, Kellor
explained in her capacity as BII chief that “‘[t]he Bureau of Industries and
Immigration not only does what it can . . . to right wrongs and secure justice,
but often directs aliens to such charitable persons as will enable them to
continue on their journey after they have parted with their last funds.’”63 In
its eagerness thus to do justice, the article suggested, the BII had taken on
the character of its leader. It was, in short, all but an extension of Kellor
herself—someone who epitomized “the burning, courageous enthusiasm of
a modern woman in action.”64
III. THE COURT-BASED MODEL
Legal elites in the early twentieth century also embraced arbitration as a
tool of public governance. In so doing, they shared the widely expressed view
that there were important parallels between arbitration and administrative
agency adjudication. But as was true of Roscoe Pound, among others, they
tended to be far less enthusiastic about this development.65 Unlike their
contemporaries who adopted models of arbitration that were intimately
connected to the burgeoning administrative state, lawyers as a whole
preferred to look to the profession’s traditional bastion of state-based
authority—namely, the courts. It was within the (lawyer-controlled) courts
that many lawyers sought to develop an approach to arbitration that would
address the myriad new challenges of modern industrial society.
Anxious to ensure their own continued preeminence, legal elites urged
the cabining of both administrative agency adjudication and arbitration
through lawyer-wielded rules and procedures. Yet, even while working to
contain these arenas of discretion, they sought to expand the discretion that
they themselves enjoyed within the courtroom—and in so doing, to position
themselves so as better to compete in responding to the challenges of
modernity. Toward this end, reform-minded lawyers argued that rigid,
legislatively enacted codes of procedure, adopted on the model of New York’s
63
64
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A Good Samaritan for Hapless Alien Hosts is Miss Frances A. Kellor, N.Y. TRIBUNE, May 12, 1912, at A4.
Id.
As is well known, Pound’s views of the administrative state were mixed—but over time, his
animosity toward it grew. See, e.g., JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN
HISTORIES OF AMERICAN LAW 211–78 (2007). Similarly, as concerns arbitration, he expressed
doubts. Even while observing that “I have . . . a great deal of faith in commercial arbitration” and
“have advocated it vigorously and consistently,” he made a point of cautioning that arbitration
could not “do the whole work of administering justice,” as many contemporaries seemed to hope.
Pound, supra note 19.
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Field Code, ought to be replaced by new procedural rules crafted in a more
flexible, ongoing fashion by judges themselves. This program of reform was
initially implemented in local municipal courts, several decades before the
enactment of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934. Indeed, though largely
forgotten today, many of the procedural innovations that eventually made
their way into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were first attempted
through municipal-court reform in such cities as Boston, Chicago,
Cleveland, and New York.66 As explained in the definitive treatise on the
newly enacted New York Municipal Court Code, which went into effect in
1915, these procedural reforms included “[s]implifying the rules and
methods of pleading,” “[e]liminating all technical rules as to joinder of
parties and of causes of action,” and “[a]bolishing technical and useless
restrictions upon judicial power in matters of procedure.”67
Accompanying these now familiar efforts to eliminate procedural
technicalities and empower judges to promote substantive justice were
various attempts to develop systems of arbitration and/or conciliation that
would operate in connection with the municipal court. These arbitrationand conciliation-based experiments aimed at serving the needs of the urban,
immigrant poor, while also endowing those lawyers serving as judges with
extensive discretionary authority—of the sort increasingly enjoyed by the
non-lawyers who staffed administrative agencies and arbitral tribunals. As
this suggests, Aragaki and Szalai are correct to insist on the important
parallels between arguments for procedural and arbitral reform. However,
the two movements were linked not only conceptually (in the sense that they
pursued many of the same goals), but also institutionally—through the
contemporary campaign for municipal-court reform.
As developed by legal elites in conjunction with, most especially, Jewish
communal leaders eager to assist (and Americanize) recent Jewish
immigrants from Eastern Europe, various such arbitration- and conciliationbased experiments—linked in different ways to the local municipal courts—
were attempted. Key among these was the Jewish Court of Arbitration,
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See, e.g., Robert Wyness Millar, Notabilia of American Civil Procedure, 1887-1937, 50 HARV. L. REV.
1017, 1035 n.92, 1063–64 (1937) (observing that notice pleading originated in the Municipal Court
of Chicago and referencing Massachusetts reforms); Rasmus S. Saby, Simplified Procedure in Municipal
Court, 18 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 760, 766–68 (1924) (describing reforms in Chicago and Cleveland);
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1055–62 (1982)
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EDGAR J. LAUER, THE NEW PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE
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which was founded in New York City in 1919.68 Continuing in operation
until the mid-1980s, the court resolved (without charge) many thousands of
disputes, thus having a significant impact on the lives of many.69 Although its
immediate aim was to aid and Americanize recently immigrated Lower East
Side Jews, it participated in a broader campaign for arbitration that extended
well beyond the Jewish community alone. The court engaged actively with
(and obtained recognition from) the leaders of the AAA and successfully
deployed arbitration (and conciliation) in service of the contemporary
movement to remake the local courts.
It was the Jewish Court’s executive secretary, Louis Richman, who took
the lead in working to connect the institution to then widespread efforts to
promote arbitration. He regularly communicated with others who were
actively involved in promoting arbitration and conciliation, including some
who played a leading role in the development of modern commercial
arbitration. Among these were Frances Kellor and Moses H. Grossman, a
former municipal-court judge who went on to help establish the AAA,
alongside Kellor.70 Richman’s efforts to position the Jewish Court as
participating in a broader arbitration movement gained some traction, as
suggested by the fact that The Arbitration Journal—a periodical issued by the
AAA and edited by Kellor—published a number of pieces on the court as
part of its effort to track developments in the field as a whole.71 Indeed, in
line with this vision of itself as a participant in the broader arbitration
movement, the Jewish Court in the mid- to late-1930s went so far as seriously
to contemplate becoming a general purpose arbitration provider, akin to the
AAA—including, not least, by shedding its sectarian, Jewish identity.72

68

69

70

71
72

The court was renamed the Jewish Conciliation Court of America in 1930 as part of an effort to
distance itself from a competitor, rather than because of any change in its practice. See Amalia D.
Kessler, The Jewish Conciliation Court as the “Official Arbitrating Organ” of the State-Run Courts
(unpublished book chapter) (on file with author).
See Joseph Kary, Judgments of Peace: Montreal’s Jewish Arbitration Courts, 1914-1976, 56 AM. J. LEG.
HIST. 436, 443–49 (2016) (describing the history of the court); Tehila Sagy, What’s So Private About
Private Ordering?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 923, 933–34 (2011) (explaining the origins and practice of
the court); JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 83–88 (1983) (“[The court] resolved
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Grossman also served as chair of the New York County Lawyers Association’s Committee on
Arbitration and Conciliation. See N.Y. County Lawyers Committees, 5 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N BULL. 369, 370
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See Kessler, The Jewish Conciliation Court, supra note 68.
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In thus positioning itself within a broader campaign to promote
arbitration (and conciliation), the Jewish Court actively sought to enmesh
itself with and thereby remake the state-run court system. As this suggests, it
embraced a profoundly public-oriented, governmental conception of
arbitration. Although the court was founded by a private act of incorporation
and obtained its funds from private charitable donations contributed by local
Jewish local elites, it engaged in highly public proceedings that were linked
in various ways to those of the local, state-run courts. It relied extensively on
sitting state-court judges, who served as arbitrators and conciliators (in ways
that would violate today’s rules of judicial ethics).73 And for decades, it held
its proceedings in public courthouses—in the view of a great many spectators.
So too, the leading lawyers and state-court judges who served on the Jewish
Court and otherwise helped to run the organization were deeply involved in
the ongoing project of local court reform, aiming to develop new procedural
and institutional mechanisms that would provide more meaningful access to
justice to the urban immigrant poor. These reformers worked within both
the Jewish Court and the state-run courts, drawing little, if any distinction
between the two and using the one as a laboratory in which to develop
approaches that might then be transplanted to the other. As just one
example, the Jewish Court and its personnel played a key role in the
emergence in 1933 of the New York Domestic Relations Court, which was
widely heralded as the embodiment of the modern ideal of the socialized
court.74 The Jewish Court, in fact, developed a relationship with the staterun courts that was so close and interconnected that it became possible, at
least for a time, to envision it as an official state entity in its own right—or
what its leaders described as “the official arbitrating organ of the [state-run]
Courts.”75 In all these respects, the court afforded a type of arbitration that
was far removed from the now dominant model of private ordering.

73

74

75

See id.; CHARLES E. GEYH & W. WILLIAM HODES, REPORTERS’ NOTES TO THE MODEL CODE
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2364

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:6

CONCLUSION
As these examples suggest, the early decades of the twentieth century
witnessed a flourishing of models of arbitration that were not directly
connected to the enactment of the FAA and that bear little, if any resemblance
to the now reigning paradigm of arbitration as a mode of private ordering.
Pursuant to these models, arbitration was a tool of public governance—one
widely viewed as parallel in nature and function to the adjudicatory apparatus
of the then flourishing administrative state. Indeed, some models of
arbitration took the form of efforts to advance new types of administrative
agency adjudication. And while legal elites preferred a model of arbitration
that was rooted in the courts, rather than administrative agencies, they too
developed the procedure in ways that aimed to serve key public functions—
akin to, and interconnected with, those of public court proceedings.
The precise nature of the relationship between these different models of
arbitration and the enactment of the FAA remains to be detailed, though it
bears emphasis that there is evidence of interconnections between the various
individuals and interests pressing for each.76 So too, we are left with the
question of how these different models developed and changed over time,
giving rise by mid-century to the now dominant view of arbitration as a form
of private ordering. But however important, these matters extend well
beyond the scope of these pages. My goal here has been more limited—
namely, to highlight the new lines of inquiry made possible by bringing a
historical sensibility to bear as we approach issues of procedure and practice.
By reading widely across multiple sources, produced in multiple institutional
contexts—and by remaining imaginatively open to the strangeness of a notso-distant past—we can begin to discern foundations of modern American
arbitration that are far removed from our now settled understandings.
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Consider, for example, the role played by Charles L. Bernheimer—the chair of the New York
Chamber of Commerce’s Committee on Arbitration and the man widely credited with leading the
chamber’s campaign for the enactment of the FAA—in promoting municipal-court reform,
including not least municipal-court-based arbitration. Bernheimer and his committee actively
lobbied for the inclusion of arbitration provisions within (and the subsequent enactment of) the
1915 New York Municipal Court Code. See Address and Report of William Liebermann in Relation
to the Establishment of a Court of Arbitration by the Kehillah of the City of New York (Apr. 25 &
26, 1914) (on file in the Collection of Judah L. Magnes Papers (P3-1848), Central Archives for the
History of the Jewish People Jerusalem, Hebrew University of Jerusalem) (noting that “[t]he New
York Chamber of Commerce urged the passage of the [code’s] arbitration provisions”). And once
the code was enacted, the chamber and its arbitration committee assisted in developing the rules
required to implement the new arbitration system. These efforts are discussed in the Annual Report
of Committee on Arbitration, in SIXTIETH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CORPORATION OF THE
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FOR THE YEAR 1917–1918, at 6 (1918).

